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            NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 09-4741 
_____________ 
 
KARNAIL SINGH,  
                                 Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                           Respondent 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Agency  No.  A072- 381-556 
Immigration Judge: The Honorable Andrew A. Arthur 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 8, 2011 
 
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:   November 10, 2011) 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________________ 
 
Smith, Circuit Judge. 
 Karnail Singh is an Indian citizen who entered this country illegally on 
December 5, 1993.  In 1994, Singh petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and humanitarian asylum. 
In 2005, Singh received a Notice to Appear charging him with being removable 
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under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  At a September 2005 hearing, Singh conceded 
removability, but indicated that he intended to renew his 1994 petition, seeking 
relief on the basis that he had suffered persecution and torture on the basis of his 
Sikh religion and his political activity advocating for an independent Sikh state.   
After holding a hearing on Singh’s renewed petition, the Immigration Judge 
(IJ) found Singh not credible due to substantial inconsistencies between Singh’s 
testimony and other evidence in the record.  The IJ alternatively found that even if 
Singh’s testimony were credible, he could no longer have a well-founded fear of 
persecution because circumstances in India had changed regarding persecution of 
Sikhs.  Finally, the IJ found that even if Singh’s testimony were credible, the 
persecution that he suffered did not rise to the level of persecution necessary to 
warrant humanitarian asylum.  The IJ denied Singh’s petition.  Singh appealed the 
IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  On December 3, 2009, 
the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.  Singh now petitions for review, arguing, 
among other things, that the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility 
determination.1
Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we 
review the IJ’s determination for substantial evidence.  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 
  We will deny Singh’s petition. 
                                                 
1 The IJ had jurisdiction over Singh’s petition under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231(b).  
The BIA had jurisdiction over Singh’s appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  We 
exercise jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).   
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F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003).  An IJ is in the best position to assess a petitioner’s 
credibility—accordingly, “[w]e will defer to and uphold the IJ’s adverse credibility 
determinations if they are ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole . . . .’”  Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 
212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).  
“[A]n adverse credibility finding [can] be based on inconsistencies, but only if the 
inconsistencies relate[] to facts at the heart of the claim, rather than to unimportant 
details.”  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). 2
The discrepancies cited by the IJ concern the very acts of persecution that 
 
The IJ provided cogent, specific reasons for his finding of adverse 
credibility.  At the hearing, the IJ questioned Singh vigorously about various 
discrepancies between Singh’s account of his prior persecution and other evidence 
in the record.  The IJ gave Singh an opportunity to explain the inconsistencies.  
Unsatisfied with Singh’s responses, the IJ found that Singh was not credible, in a 
comprehensive opinion citing numerous discrepancies between Singh’s testimony 
and the evidentiary record. 
                                                 
2 The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302-23 
(2005), changed the standard of review for adverse credibility findings for petitions 
filed on or after May 11, 2005.  Because Singh’s petition was originally filed in 
1994, however, “our pre-REAL ID Act standard applies to evaluation of the 
credibility determination.  Consequently, only inconsistencies going to the heart of 
a claim will be deemed to compromise [a petitioner’s] credibility.”  Chukwu, 484 
F.3d at 189. 
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Singh cites as the basis for his petition.  For example, at the hearing Singh testified 
that his father was killed by Indian police at a famous attack on a Sikh temple, 
which in part motivated him to join a political group dedicated to forming a Sikh 
state.  Other evidence in the record, however, suggested that Singh’s father was not 
involved in the attack mentioned by Singh, and that he went missing after the 
attack.  This inconsistency, like others cited by the IJ, concern the very events of 
persecution that Singh claims as a basis for asylum, withholding of removal, 
protection under CAT, and humanitarian asylum.  These inconsistencies clearly go 
to the heart of his claim.  Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 189.  As a result, the IJ’s adverse 
credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the BIA did 
not err in adopting the IJ’s credibility determination.   
Given the adverse credibility determination, which called into question 
Singh’s testimonial evidence regarding his history of persecution, the BIA also did 
not err in concluding that Singh failed to meet his burden of proof under all of the 
relevant standards.3
                                                 
3  Although each of the forms of relief that Singh requests has different 
requirements, Singh’s testimony regarding his past persecution and torture is 
critical for each form of relief he seeks.  Given the adverse credibility 
determination, the BIA did not err in concluding that Singh failed to meet his 
burden of proof under each of the applicable standards.  Because Singh failed to 
meet his evidentiary burden, we need not reach the IJ’s alternative reasons for 
denying Singh’s petition, concerning the finding of changed circumstances for 
Sikhs in India and whether Singh’s alleged persecution qualifies him for 
humanitarian asylum.   
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Accordingly, we will deny Singh’s petition for review. 
